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!\el L:1 C. Sohm 
~ttorncy for Plaintiff 
Suite 81 Trolley Square 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
~ll-7c'23 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COTTON\VO()D MALL s HOPP IW; 
CENTER, INC. , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PUBLIC-SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTl\H, and FRANK S. WARNER 
and OLOF E. ZUNDEL, Commis-
sioners, and UTAH POWER AND 
Lil,HT COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 14568 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
The defendant, Public Service Commission of Utah, rested 
its whole argument on the question of Res Judicata and that is 
the principal basis of the arguments of defendant Utah Power 
and Liqht Company. The latter defendant also contends the Com-
mission correctly determined the plaintiff was not exempt from 
regulation. We address ourselves first to the matter of Res 
Judicata. 
Point I 
THE D0CTRINE OF' RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY IN THE COTTONWOOD 
~11\LL CASE BECAUSE: 
1. THE FACTS, THE IDENTITY OF THE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE 
IDENTITY IN THE QUALITY OF PERSONS INVOLVED HAVE 
CHANGED. 
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2. THE BURDEN IS ON THE PARTY ASSERTING RES JUDICl\T; 
TO EST/\BLISH BY AFFIRMATIVE PROOF, THAT THE CAIJSL 
OF ACTIOll I!NOLVED AND Tf!E PARTIES ARE IDENTICAL -
THIS CASE. 
3. UNDER THE ERIE CASE THE STATE COURT SHOULD DECIITT 
Hmv UTAH LAW APPLIES I;:J UTAH. 
4. IF RES ADJUDICATA IS TO APPLY, A PERSON SHOULD NOC 
BOUND BY A JUDGMENT UNLESS HE HAS HAD ADEQUATE OPP_ 
TUNI'l'Y TO LITIGATE MATTERS ADJUDICATED AGArnST HI::. 
5. THE LAW OF THE LAND HAS CHANGED SINCE THE FEDERAL 
COURT RULED IN THE COTTONWOOD MALL CASE. 
1. MOST JURISDICTIONS INDICATED THAT IN ORDER TO APPLY TITTE 
JUDICATE DOCTRINE, THERE MUST BE FOUR ELEMEHTS PRESENT: 
a. Identity of subject matter, 
b. Iden~i~ af cause of action, 
c. Identity of persons and parties, 
d. Identity in the quality of persons for or against ~~ 
the claim is made. 
Cooper v Warnock, Wash., 134 P 2 706, 709 
Smith v Gray, Nevada, 250 P 369 
Pompanio v Larsen, Colorado, 251 P. 534 
Paroutsis v Gregory, Penn., 35 A2 559 
Res Judicata can apply only when the issues are identi 
Emerson Estate v Cook, Ill., 50 NE 2 772 
McCormick v Hartman, Mich., 10 NW 2 910 
Klassen v Central Kansas Corp., Kans., 165 P2 601, GOi 
Res Judicata is not available where the issue in an 
differs in any wav from the issue in our earlier action 1' Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the same parties. 
Cartev v Klein, New York, 24 NYS2 67 68 
When it appears an issue was not determined bv judgment, 
it is not Res judicata. 
Stark v Coher, Calif., 129 p2 290, 393 
Panos v Great Western, Calif., 126 p2 889, 895 
In the case of West Jordon, Inc., 7 Utah 2d 391, 326 p2d1os, 
1958, certain land owners obtained a judgment for severance from 
the town by a District Court decree. About two weeks later the 
town passed an ordinance annexing the lands theretofore severed. 
The landowner brought another action and the Honorable A. H. Ellett 
dismissed the suit on grounds of Res Judicata. The Supreme Court 
reversed the lower court on the theory that the cause of action had 
changed. 
"Since the lands did not again become part of the 
territory of the town until two weeks after the 
severance in the prior action, their petition did 
not involve the same cause of action even though 
part of the subject matter was the same and the 
same reasons were given for desiring the serverance." 
"Since this action is based on a new and different 
ordinance which necessarily requires the determina-
tion of essentially different facts from those 
determined in the previous action that doctrine 
can have no application to this case." 
Obviously this case shows how liberal the Utah Courts are 
on the matter of Res Judicata. The Cottonwood Mall case has a 
much stronger basis to show a change of facts and cause of action. In 
the Cottonwood Mall case the facts have changed, the identity of the 
subject matter has changed and the identity of the quality of per-
30n has changed. one of the principal pegs on which the Federal 
-,-,urt hung its hat was the fact that Eldredge Furniture Company 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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had purchased its store area and owned that one section of. 
Cottonwood Mall. The frict is that now, and at the time a~c 
cation was made to the Public Service Commission, Eldredge 
Furniture had sold its space back to the Mall so the plain:. 
owned all of the Cottonwood Mall property. Obviously the 1, 
have changed. The identity of the subject matter has chan~ 
in that plaintiff now owns all the property. The identity• 
the quality of person has changed in that the Federal court 
found the Mall would be a utility and now it would not be a 
utility. We do not concede that the Federal Court made a 
correct decision even in view of the Eldredge ownership, but 
certainly this change is a material change sufficient to ta·. 
the case outside of the bounds of Red Judicata and is suffk 
to open tht= 'Tlatter for a decision of this court on its merit 
or for a reversal to send back to the Public Service Commis· 
sion to rule the plaintiff is exempt. 
In the case of East Mill Creek Water Co. v Salt La~ 
Utah 1945, 159 p2d 863, the court held: 
"Where claim, demand or cause of action is different 
in the two cases, then judgment in the earlier cases 
is res judicata of the later only to extent that the 
earlier judgment actually raised and decided the same 
points and issues which are raised in the later case 
This case followed numberous other Utah cases as foL 
Everill v. Swan, 20 Utah 56, 57 P. 716. Glen Allen 
Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 
296 P. 231; Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P. 2d 
699; Logan City v. Utah Power & Light Co., 86 Utah 
340, 16 P. 2d 1097, on rehearing, 86 Utah 354, 44 
P. 2d 698; State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365 at paqe 
422, 120 P 2d 285 at page 315. 
• 
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46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments §443 states: 
"Clearly, the enforcement of the rule of res Judi-
cata may not be avoided by the discovery of new 
evidence bearing on a fact or issue invovled in 
the original action, as distinguished from a sub-
sequen~ fact or event which creates a new legal 
situation, even though the newly discovered evi-
dence might have been sufficient to justify a new 
trial in the first case. However, where, after 
the rendition of a jud9ment, subsequent events 
occur, creating a new legal situation or altering 
the ~egal rights or relations of the litigants, · 
the Judgment may therebv be precluded from operating 
as an estoppel. In such case, the earlier adjudi-
cation is not permitted to bar a new action to 
vindicate rights subsequently ~red, even if the 
same property is the subject matter of both actions." 
The many footnote cases include California, Idaho and 
Washington cases. 
states: 
§443 goes on to say: 
"In this connection, it has been declared that the 
doctrine of res judicata extends only to facts and 
conditions as they existed at the time the judg-
ment was rendered, and that a judgment is not res 
judicata as to rights which were not in existence 
at the time of the rendition of the judgment. It 
has even been held that the effect of a judgment 
as res judicata may be preduced by events creating 
a new leoal situation occurring pendente lite before 
the rendition of the judgment, where a supplemental 
pleading is not filed." 
§382 discussing merger of cause of action in Judgment 
"However the doctrine of merger of a cause of action 
in the j~dgment rendered thereon is calculated ~o pro-
mote justice, and will be applied with.due c;:onsidera-
tion of the demands of justice and equity; it maf be" 
carried no further than the ends of justice require. 
Adam v Davies, Utah, 156 P2 207 158 ALR 852.§383 
te>Ils us that this doctrine and the doctrine of Res Judicata 
may be regarded as identical. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Restatement Judgments §54 states that where a judgw,, 
is rendered for the defendant on the ground of the nonexist~ 
of some fact essential to the plaintiff's cause of action,~ 
plaintiff is not precluded fro~ maintaining an action after 
such fact has subsequently come into existence. 
Even in the Knight case cited by both defendants, on4 
part of the facts were considered as affected by Res Judica~. 
not the whole case. 
In asserting that no facts were presented in evidence 
at the argument before the Public Service Commission the de-
fendants are admitting that they did not present any eviden~ 
to show that the facts in this case are the same as the facts 
in the case before the Federal Court. The burden is clear~ 
on the movina nri:-tv to prove circumstances are the same. 
Parties asserting Res Judicata must establish, by 
affirmative proof, that the cause of action involved 
and parties are identical as in this case. Mccann 
v Iowa Mutual Liability Ins. 1 Nw2 682, 688 
~- NEITHER THE UTAH COURTS NOR OTHER COURTS HAVE STRICTLY 
FOLLOWED THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA. JUSTICE AND PUB· 
LIC POLICY ARE TIIE COlnROLLING CONSIDERATIONS. 
In the recent~~se of Tates, Inc v Little America, 535 
P2 1228 and SS"t p2 /,2. 57 , this court first reversed the lo>' 
courts judgment for defendant in favor of the plaintiff and 
remanded the case back to the lower court. The lower court 
granted the defendant's motion for a new trial and religated 
the same issues over the objections of the plaintiff. On the 
second appeal, this court upheld the lower court despite the 
principle of Res Judicata. 
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46 Arn Jur 2d, Judgments §402 states: 
"The doctrine of res judicata may be said to adhere 
in legal systems as the rule of justice. Hence, the 
position has been taken that the doctrine of res 
judicata is to be applied in particular situations 
as fairness and justice require, and that it is not 
to be applied so rigidly as to defeat the ends of 
justice or so as to work as injustice. 
The sound policy behind the doctrine is also to be 
considered in applying the doctrine. . . Moreover, 
there are exceptions to the doctrine as res judicata 
based upon other important reasons of policy. In 
this respect it has been declared that res judicata, 
as the embodiment of a public policy, must at times 
be weighed against competing interests, and must, 
on occasion, yield to other policies. The determina-
tion of the question concerning judicial reconsid-
eration is said to require a compromise, in each 
case of the two opposing policies, of the desirab-
ility and finality and the public interest in reach-
ing t~e right result. 
Underlying all discussion of the problem must be 
the principle of fundamental fairness in the due 
process sense. It has accordingly been adjudged 
that the public policy underlying the principle of 
res judicata must be considered together with the 
policy that a party shall not be deprived of a fair 
adversary proceeding in which to present his case. 
It has also been declared that a determination of 
issues in an action between private parties cannot 
bar a contest to vindicate the public interest." 
3. UNDER THE ERIE CASE, THE STATE COURT SHOULD DECIDE HOW UTAH 
LAW APPLIES IN UTAH. 
Justice Brandeis in the Erie v Tompkins case, 304 US 
64 in overruling the Tysen case states: 
"Except in matters governed by the Federal Cons~itu­
tion or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied 
in any case in the law of the State. And whether 
the law of the State shall be declared by its Legis-
lature in a statute or by its highest court in a 
decision is not a matter of federal concern." 
ond the Justice goes on to say this rule of law is necessary 
to preserve, "the autonomy and independence of the states -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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independence in their legislative and independence in their 
judicial departments." This principle was followed by ,Just. 
Frankfurter in the Guaranty Trust Co, v York case, 326 u .S. j 
The plaintiff contends the Federal Court did not folL 
the law in Utah, instead it declared that no law had been mad: 
on the subject. We contend that the law was made on the sub-
ject. We contend that the law was made on the subject as se 
forth in our main brief pages 10 through 13 both by the cou~ 
and the legislature. The legislature made it clear that com-
panies like the plaintiff should not be regarded as Utiliti~ 
but were exempt where distributuion is through "private pro-
perty, i.e., property not dedicated to public use, solely 
for his own use or use of his tenants. The reasoning 
of counsel for the defendant is fallacious and unsound when 
they argue t~at the legislation exception does not apply to 
Mall because no Malls were in existence in 1917 when the l~ 
was enacted. That is like saying the U.S. Constitution does 
not apply to the jet, rocket, calculator, T.V. and computera 
we are in now because they didn't exist 200 years ago. That 
great constitution still rules our greatly advance civilizat: 
with only a few admendments. The exception doesn't have to 
identify each case specifically wherein it applies; but, obv1 
the exception applies to all property "not dedicated to pubL 
use". 
THE UTAH COURT IS NOT FORECLOSED FROM NOW ANNOUNCING 
THE LAW IN THIS MATTER. 
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In the case of Atkins v Schmutz Manufacturing co., 
372 Fed. 2 762, decided in 1967, involved a question of 
whethPr a Kentucky one-year statute of limitation or a two-
year Virginia statute of limitation applies to a complaint 
filed in a Kentucky Federal Court when the tart occurred in 
Virginia. The Federal Court had previously held in several 
cases, following the Kentucky state courts rulings, that the 
Virginia two-year statute would apply. The plaintiff relied 
on those federal and state court cases when it filed its com-
plaint in 1963, after the one-year limitation had expired. 
The Kentucky court suddenly specifically reversed itself and 
"expressly overruled" its previous cases before this case was 
concluded which required the Federal Court to reverse its pre-
vious decision in order to follow state law. Obviously the 
state court can reserve its position or clarify its position 
and the Federal Court must follow the State Courts rulings. 
The cases cited by defendant and particularly Ham v. 
Holy Rosary Hospital are not in point. The Ham case in-
volved constitutional questions that, of course, involved fed-
eral law not state law. 
4. IF RES JUDICATA IS TO APPLY A PERSON SHOULD NOT BE BOUND 
BY A JUDGMENT m~LESS HE HAS HAD ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO 
LITIGATE MATTERS ADJUDICATED AGAINST HIM. 
In the Federal Court the plaintiff did not have his 
day in court and never had an opportunity to present evidence 
since the Federal court on a motion to dismiss converted it to 
a MoLion for Summary Judgment and ruled against the plaintiff. 
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Again before the Public Service Commission the defendant, 
Utah Power & Light, moved for dismissal and it was granted 
without taking any evidence or giving the plaintiff a chance 
to be heard. The case of Davis v. First National Bank of 
Waco (Texas), 161 sw 2 467, holds that under Res Judicata a 
person should not be bound by a judgment unless he has had 
an adequate opportunity to litigate matters adjudicated again: 
him. In the North Dakota case, Knutson v Ekren, 5 c~w2 7 4, t;,, 
court held the issues must be fully tried and litigated. 
5. THE LAW OF THE LAND HAS CHANGED SINCE THE FEDERAL COURT 
RULING. 
The Judge Ritter decree in the Cottonwood Mall case 
was dated July 11, 1969, holding the shopping center would 
not be a public utility. The Lloyd v Tanner case cited and 
quoted extens1.vely in our original brief was decided by the 
United States Supreme Court in June, 197 2, reversing the lower 
court and holding that the center was private property and 
holding that the shopping center had not dedicated any part 
of its property to public use even though roads through it 
were public and even though it held the same kind of non busi· 
ness functions that the Cottonwood Mall held. This ruling in 
effect overruled the former law of the land laid out in the 
Logan valley decision. 
We call to the courts attention a new U.S. Supreme~ 
case, Scott Hudgens v National Labor Relations Board, 47 L Ed 
2d 196, decided March 3, 1976. This case involved picketing 
of a privately owned shopping center. The shopping center 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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tried to stop the picketing in the center. The National Labor 
Relations Board held against the center even in view of the 
Lloyd case and the Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order. 
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeal's judgment 
and held in favor of the shopping center using the Lloyd case 
as the chief basis of its ruling. The majority held that the 
holding in the Lloyd case "amounted to a total rejection of the 
holding and rational in the Logal valley decision". The shopp-
ing center was private property. What the Lloyd case and the 
Hudgens cases means to the Cottonwood Mall case is that the 
mall must be held to be private property and the fact that it 
serves customers and the public both paying and non paying, 
that its facilities are not converted to public facilities. 
And the light and power provided whether to paying customers 
or non paying customers, whether during regular business hours 
or on off hours, the power is for its own use or its tenants use. 
46 Am Jur 2d, Judgment §444 
"It is particularly with respect to the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel precluding the religation 
of an issue adjudicated in the previous action on 
a difference cause of action, that a change in the 
law after the rendition of the judgment operates 
to deny conclusiveness to the judgment. 
The rules that a judgment may be denied a conclu-
sive effect because there has been a change in 
the law since its rendition has also been regarded 
as applicable to a change in the law by interme-
diate judicial decision of either a state or a 
federal court." 
Point II 
THE COTTONWOOD MALL ELECTRICAL PLANT IS EXEMPT FROM 
PECULATION BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION· 
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We have already presented argument on this matter in 
our prior brief so we present only a few cases to further 
rebut the defendant's allegations. 
In the 1968 Massachusetts case, Re Frank Properties, 
Inc. 72 PUR 3d 305, where applicant applied for an advisory 
ruling on the question of whether a shop9ing center landlord 
proposing to furnish tenants "total energy service" would he 
subject to regulation. After a well considered opinion, a 
copy of which is attached, the Public Utilities Department 
ruled that the landlord would not be a public utility. The 
ruling has stood in effect thereafter. The case is signifi-
cant because the analyzed leading court cases dealing with 
"total energy" from Pennsylvania (Drexellrook Associates v 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 1965, 212 A 2d 237), 
from Wisconsin (Re City of Sun Prairie, 1965, 57 PUR 3d 525 
and General Split Corp., 1962, 44 PUR 3d 334), from New Jerse. 
(Freehold Water & Utility Co. v Silver Mobile Home Park, 1961 
68 PUR 3d 523). 
In the case Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company 
where the Ohio Shopping Centers Asso. Intervened, 53 PUR 3d 
234, 1964, held that the Ohio Public Utilities Co=ission hac 
no jurisdiction over sales of electrical energy by the Sho~: 
Center and that the Shopping Center was not a public utilitY· 
In Llano, Inc v Southern Union Gas Co., N.M. 1964, 391 
P 2d 646, the court considered the case where Llano purchas~ 
natural gas for delivery and resale to one industrial cust~· 
They quote from 73 CJS Public Utilities §2 and from 43 Arn .J. 
571 Public Utilities and then states: 
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"Applying these rules to the facts in the instant 
case we think the conclusion is inescapable that 
Llano at no time held itself out as engaged in 
supplying natural gas "to or for the public," or 
to any limited portion of the public which might 
re~uire natural gas, to the extent of Llano's 
capacity. It is now legally committed to serve 
but one private industry, and has held itself 
out as willing to serve only such other private 
industrial users as its selects, if and when 
additional natural gas reserves are available 
to it. Nor do we find any evidence, in support 
of the Co.mnission' s finding and/or conclusion, 
that Llano has held and is holding itself as 
ready, willing and able to provide natural gas 
service to or for the public or any segment thereof." 
We also attach a copy of the City of San Prairie case 
(1967) and the Drexellrook case (1965). Both of these cases in-
valved landlords of big apartment complexes. The Public Util-
ities laws of each state are about the same as that in the state 
of Utah "providing gas or electrity to or for the public". 
The principal of Res Judicata does not apply in the 
Cottonwood Mall case and clearly the mall operation is exempt 
from regulation by the commission. 
Wherefore, ve pray the Honorable Court reverse the rul-
ing of the Public Service Commission finding the Cottonwood Mall 
is exempt from regulation by the commission. 
Respectfully submitted, 
' rKei th E. Sohm 
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Copies of the foregoing Reply were served upon dPf",i·· 
dants by mailing first class to attorneys for defendants, P 1 t. 
ert Gordon, P. 0. Box 899 Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, and t 0 
G. Blaine Davis, 236 State Capitol B0ilding., Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84114, dated this 3rd day of November, 1967. 
/ / 
Keith E. Sohm ---
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Appendix A 
RE FRA~K PROPERTIES, INC. 
}vfASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 
Re Frank Properties, Inc. 
D.P.U. 15715 
January 29, 1968 
A PPLICATION for advisory ru!ill!J on question whether shop-ping center landlord proposing to furnish tenants total 
ellergy service would be subject to regulation; r1t!i11g granted, 
and proposed operation found not subject to regulation. 
Public utilities, § 11 - Advisory ruling as to utility status - Landlord total energy 
seTVlce. 
1. Upon application for an advisory ruling on the question whether a shop-
ping center landlord which proposes to furnish total energy service to its 
tenants would be subject to utility regulation, the department of public 
utilities would exercise its discretion to give such a ruling where the land-
lord proposed to make a substantial investment and where the total energy 
concept was receiving wide attention at the time, p. 306. 
Public utilities. § 23 - Regulation dependent upon sale of se1-::ice - Stalitte. 
2. A Massachusetts statute which subjects to regulation "all . . . cor-
porations which . . . operate works . . . for the manufacture and 
sale or distribution and sale of gas . . . or of electricity" makes regula-
tion dependent upon the e..'<istence of a sale, unlike statutes in other jurisdic-
tions which make regulation dependent upon the public nature of the activity, 
p. 307. 
Public utilities, § 41 - Landlord "total energy" services to tenants. 
3. A shopping center landlord is not a gas or electric company subject to 
regulation under a statute subjecting to regulation "all . . . corporations 
which . . . operate works . . . for the manufacture and sale or dis-
tribution and sale of gas . . . or of electricity" where the landlord, 
using gas either directly or converting it, proposed to provide total energy 
sen;ce-heating, electric current, domestic hot "·ater, and chilled water for 
air conditioning-for "·hich each tenant initially will pay 35 cents per annum 
per square foot as an additional component of the rental, and where the 
landlord '"ill make meter readings of such service to tenants for two years, 
on which to establish charges for the remainder of 10-year leases without 
regard to the quantity of energy consumed by the tenants during such pe~iod; the commission found that the arrangement was "rent inclusion," 
p. 308. 
.. 
By the DEPARTMENT: On July 10, with tenants under which it proposes 
1967, Frank Properties, Inc., a Del- to supply tenants with variou5 energy 
aware corporation engaged in the busi- requirements. commonly known as 
ness of owning and oper:iting shopping "tot;:i1 energy" plan. file<l a request for 
centers. having entered into leases :111 a<hisory ruling. pursuant to § 8 of 
[20) 305 72 PUR 3rl 
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Chap 30:\ of the General Laws, "as 
to the legality of the proposed plan in 
the light of the regulations and stat-
utes administered . . " bv the 
department of public utilities. if it con-
ducted activities described herein. 
Documents and written representa-
tions as to the operations of Frank 
Properties, Inc., have been received 
by the department. The Massachu-
setts Electric Company was given an 
opportunity to be heard in this matter 
and declined this opportunity. 
[ 1] The promulgation of advisory 
rulings is discretionary with the de-
partment. Since Frank Properties. 
Inc., proposes to make a substantial 
investment, the advisability of which 
may depend in large part on the legal 
effect of the proposed operation and 
since the total energy concept is one 
that is receiving wide attention,1 the 
department believes that this is an ap-
propriate matter for an advisory rul-
ing. It must be emphasized that the 
ruling relates to the specific facts set 
forth in this opinion, and any variation 
from these facts in this or any other 
case might require a different ruling. 
In addition, it is important that the 
issue we are ruling on be precisely de-
fined. The request for the ruling states 
the issue in terms of "legality" which 
is too general. The arrangement 
might or might not be legal for a com-
pany subject to Chap 164. There is a 
threshold question, however; namely, 
whether this arrangement would con-
stitute Frank Properties, Inc., a "gas 
company" or an "electric company" 
under the provisions of § § 1 and 2 of 
Chap 164 of the General Laws. In 
this opinion we address ourselves to 
that question alone and we note no de-
termination as to the propriety of this 
arrangement for a company which is 
subject to regulation under Chap 164. 
Frank Properties, Inc., has entered 
into leases with various tenants for a 
shopping center in \Vorcester, :VIassa-
chusetts. It will purchase gas from 
the Worcester Gas Company and will 
use the gas directly, or by converting 
it, for all the energy requirements of 
the tenants. Under its lease arrange-
ment the landlord will supply heating 
and chilling water for air conditioning 
and heating, electric current, and do-
mestic hot water. Each tenant will 
pay 55 cents per annum, per square 
ioot as an additional component of 
this rental. 
Each lease will be for a minimum 
period of ten years. During the first 
two years meters will be installed to 
measure the tenant's consumption of 
electricity, heating, cooling, and do-
mestic hot water. The meters will be 
read each month and the tenant will 
he furnished a copy of the reading. At 
the end of two years a new charge for 
the services will be fixed, determined 
on the basis of the following: (a) 
Average cost of filters used, (b) meter 
readings based on the unit cost for 
electricity at the rate of .0131 cents 
per kilowatt-hour, heating .0183 cents 
per unit of 10,000 Btu. cooling .02i2 
cents per unit of 10,000 Btu, domestic 
hot water .12 5 cents per 100 gallons 
exclusive of normal water charges. 
The amount previously paid by the 
tenant during the 2-ycar period will 
be adjusted and the tenant will pay the 
new fixed charge during the remainder 
of the lease term without regard to the 
I See, e g., address of Ernest W. Giboon, Ne'~ England Public Utility Commissioners 
Chairman, Public Service Board of Vermont, Conference, June 26-28, 1967. 
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11u;u1tity of energy he consumes dur- rnrnpa11ics tfJ sell tht' equipment be-
1:1g this period. cause the consummation oi the trans-
[Z] Our determination is governed action would make the landlord a 
in· the provisions oi ~~ I and 2 oi "p11liiic utility'' ior which a separate 
l'liap 164, which delineate the entities a11tliorization of the co1111nissinn was 
tl1at are sui.Jject to regulation Ly this rc<[uired. The Pennsylvania supreme 
department and have the duties and court reversed. The applicaLle statute 
oliligations oi public utilities (although defined a "public utility" as one iur-
that term is not used in the chapter). nishing gas or electricity "to . 
Section 1 determines which domestic the public," and, the court held, serv-
corporations are subject to Chap 164, ice limited to tenants only was not 
:u1d is not therefore applicable to service to the "public." 
Frank Properties, Inc. Section 2, Similarly, in Freehold \Vater & 
however, contains substantially iden- Utility Co. v Silver ~Iobile Home 
tical definitions applicable to foreign Park (NJ 196i) 68 PGR3d 523, a 
corporations. The difference between mobile home park owner which sup-
the two sections is that foreign corpo- plied water to its tenants was held not 
rations are not subject to certain types to be a public utility under a statute 
oi regulation, principally control of which defined utility as a company 
security issues. which supplied water for "public use." 
Section 2 provides that substantially Among the reasons cited by the com-
all the other regulatory provisions mission were the absence oi metering, 
,hall apply to "all corpora- the limitation oi service to tenants, 
tions which operate works anJ t!1e incidental nature of the opera-
for the manufacture and sale tion of the water supply as compared 
or distribution and sale oi gas . . , to the main business of the trailer 
or of electricity . " park. 
Because of this special language The Wisconsin Public Service Com-
defining the jurisdiction of this de- mission dealt with a "total energy" 
partment, decisions in other states re- arrangement in Re City of Sun Prairie 
lating to similar arrangements between (\Vis 1965) 57 PUR3d 525, and held 
l:tndlord and tenants are not appropri- that the landlord was not a "public 
;i.te. In Dre..xelbrook Associates v utility" because the use of energy, be-
Pennsylvania Pub. Utility Commis- ing limited to tenants was not being 
sion (1965) 418 Pa 430, 60 PUR3d supplied to the "public," as provided 
175, 212 A2d 237, the landlord pro- in the statute. It was pointed out that 
rosed to acquire certain equipment there would be no submetering though 
irom the electric and water company apparently no reliance was placed on 
serving it. It would then buy gas, this fact. See also General Split Corp. 
water, and electricity at certain meter- v P.&V. Atlas Industrial Center, Inc. 
ing points and distribute the gas, wa- (Wis 1962) 44 PUR3d 334. 
ter, and electricity to tenants who It is the public nature of the activity 
would be separately metered and which controls regulatory jurisdiction 
charged by the landlord, The com- in these states. Whether gas or elec-
mission denied the application of the tricity is being sold is only incidentally 
307 72 PUR Ju 
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relevant if at all. T!te cases arc tltcrc- lo rcbulation under Chap 164. Re 
fore not rersmsive in construing our Lr"'-cll (:\fass 1957) D.P.U. 11694. 
statute which 111akes nn reference to T!tis is not such a case, however. The 
the "ru!Jlic." but 111akcs re;;u!ation charge which the landlord rroposes to 
depend on the existence of :i "sale." make cm·ers far more than the use of 
On the other hand, our decisions electricity or gas. It includes, for ex-
( and those oi the supreme judicial ample, heating and cooling. Although 
court) relating to "resale" of electric- the fuel cost may be a component to 
ity, though not directly related to pos- his charge to the tenant, it cannot be 
sible regulatory jurisdiction over separately stated apart from the cost 
landlords, furnish useful clues as to of equipment and labor necessary to 
the meaning of our statute as applied provide the tenant with heat. The use 
to total energy arrangements. In Re of meters describea herein does not 
Boston Edison Co. ( :Vfass 1953) 98 make the arrangement a sale oi gas or 
PUR NS 427, affd sub nom. Boston electricity. At most, only the elec-
Real Estate Board v Massachusetts tricity portion of tlie charge could be 
Dept. of Pub. Utilities ( 1956) 334 said to be directly measured. The use 
:Vfass 477, 15 PUR3d 47, 136 NE2d of gas for heating and air conditioning 
243, we held that Boston Edison Com- is only indirectly measured through 
pany was justified in filing a tariff the measurement of heat. 
under which no power would be sold The controlling fact is that over the 
within the territory in which it sold entire course of the lease the charge 
electricity to any person purchasing the will not be based on measured con-
power for resale. By this tariff amend- sumption, even of 'he electric portion 
ment the company brought an end to of the charge. BecaL1se the total energy 
the practice of landlords purchasing concept is new, it is difficult to esti-
power at wholesale rates and sub- mate the portion of the rent that the 
metering it to their tenants. There landlord must charge for heat, hot 
was no occasion to decide whether water, air conditioning, and electricity. 
such landlords were themselves sub- The metering for the 2-year period 
ject to regulatior, but it is clear from merely provides a basis for estimating 
the language that this department and a fair rental of the premises. The sit-
the supreme judicial court considered uation is not sig 1ificantly different 
that the practice constituted a "resale." from that of an apartment building 
Compare A. W. Perry, Inc. v Boston landlord who supplies heat and hot 
Edison Co. (Mass 1947) 70 PUR NS water and electricity to the tenants 
161; Re Boston Edison Co. (Mass without metering. The difference is 
1949) D.P.U. 8228. that this landlord through the accumu-
[3] If Frank Properties, Inc., pro- lated experience of apartment house 
posed to meter the electricity or gas owners is able to estimate with reason-
consumed by each tenant and charge able certainty the ~ost to him of sup-
on the basis of the meter reading, wc plying these services over the long 
would be constrained to hold that this run. The metering in this case pro-
constituted a "sale" of gas or electric- vides for a new arrangement on the 
ity, subjecting Frank Properties, Inc., same basis as exists for the long-stand-
72 PURJd 308 
ing practice with respect to apartment 
houses. 
Accordingly, wc be! ieve that the ar-
rangement described herein is rent in-
clusion as that tcr111 was used in 
D.l'.U. SSG2, and we rule that on 
these facts the lam.llord Frank Proper-
ties, Inc., would not be a gas company 
nr an electric company. 
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SUN PRAIRIE v PUBLIC SERVICE CO:\IMISSION 
WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT 
City of Sun Prairie 
v 
Wisconsin Public Service Commission 
Additional respondents: Lewis P. Brooks, Brooks Equipment 
Leasing, Inc., and \Visconsin Gas Company 
- Wis 2d -. 154 N\V2d 360 
N ovembcr 28, 1967 
A PPEAL from judg1.11e11t affirming commission decision that landlord providing services to tenants was not public 
utility; affirmed. For commission decision, see ( 1965) 57 
PUR3d 525 
Statutes, § 11 - Judicial co11structio11. 
1. A construction given to a statute by the court becomes a part thereof 
unless the legislature subsequently amends the statute to effect a change, 
p. 418. 
Public «tilities, § 41 - Services by apartment complex to tenants. 
2. A landlord of a large apartment complex furnishing heat, water, light, 
and power to all tenants, but not serving any adjoining landowners or the 
public generally, is not a public utility and therefore not subject to commis-
sion jurisdiction, p. 418. 
Proceeding by plaintiff city of Sun not require a certificate of convenience 
Prairie to review a declaratory ruling and necessity. 
of the Public Service Commission of The city of Sun Prairie, which is 
\Visconsin that the project of defend- a public utility operating under an in-
ant Brooks Equipment Leasing, Inc. determinate permit to furnish electric 
(hereinafter "Brooks"), in furnishing heat, light, and power to the public 
heat, power, light, and water to its within its boundaries, made applica-
tenants in its multiple apartment com- tion to the commission for such de-
plex does not bring Brooks within the claratory ruling on July 23, 1964. 
definition of a "public utility" as de- Brooks was then the owner of a 15-
fined by § 196.01 ( 1), Statutes. Lewis acre parcel of land in the city of Sun 
P. Brooks, its president, was also Prairie on which it proposed to con-
joined as a party defendant. Because struct a 240-unit apartment project 
Brooks was not a public utility, the housed in 15 buildings that will house 
commi~sion detennined Brooks was up to 1,000 people. Heat, light, water, 
not within its jurisdiction and did and power will be supplied by Brooks 
[ 27) 417 71 PUR 3d 
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t•1 ;ill tenants in tlte 11r«ject. :\' ;illtral 
gas will be purchased by it to operate 
c11c;i11cs \\'liich will drive iour electrical 
generators with a total capacity oi 
jQQ kw. I l eat-rcco\'cry equipment 
will utilize waste hc:it from the en-
gines to furnish low-pressure steam 
to heat :ind air condition all 240 
apartment units. No water, electric-
ity, or heat will be supplied to adjoin-
ing landowners or to the public 
gcnerally. The rents paid by the ten-
ants wil~ cover the expense of the 
utility services, so that they will not 
be separately billed for same. Brooks 
will rent an apartment "to any re-
sponsible person" who is able to pay 
the rent. 
After the commission made its 
declaratory ruling, the city of Sun 
Prairie petitioned the commission for 
:i rehearing. Upon the denial of such 
petition, the city then instituted the 
instant review proceeding in circuit 
court. 
By judgment entered February 13, 
1967, the circuit court affirmed the 
declaratory ruling of the commission, 
and the city has appe:iled. 
The Wisconsin Gas Company, 
which sells gas to Brooks for use 
in its project, appeared in the pro-
ceedings before the commission and in 
the review before the circuit court, and 
opposed the city'$ petition. 
APPEARANCES: Petersen, Suther-
land, Axley & Brynelson, Madison, 
Wilmer E. Trodahl, City Attorney, 
Sun Prairie, for appellant; Bronson 
C. La Follette, Attorney General, 
'William E. Torkelson and Oarence 
B. Sorenson, Madison, for Public 
Service Commission; Stafford, Rosen. 
Lewis P. ~rooks and Brooks Equip-
nient I.cas1ng-. Tnc.; Foley, Sammond 
& T.:irdner, Vernon A. Swanson and 
~· ' 
·". ]. Lesselyoung, :.lilwaukee, for 
respondent \Visconsin Gas Company. 
CURRIE, Ch. J.: 
[1, 2] The issue on this appeal is 
whether the landlord of a large com-
plex which furnishes heat, light, water. 
and power to its tenants is a public 
utility within the definition oi § 196.01 
( 1), Stats, so as to be under the 
jurisdiction of the public service com-
mission. This statute defines a public 
utility as follows: 
"'Public utility' means and em-
braces every corporation, company, 
individual, . . town, village, <Jr 
city that may own, operate, manage. 
or control . . . any part of a pl:int 
or equipment, within the state . . 
for the production, transmission, de-
livery, or furnishing vf heat, light, 
water, or power either directly or in-
dire1:tly to or for the public. . . ." 
We deem Cawker v Meyer1 to be 
determinative of the result. In that 
case the landlord constructed a build-
ing in the city of Milwaukee to be 
rented for stores, offices, and light 
manufacturing purposes. A steam 
plant was installed therdn to generate 
heat, electric light, and power to be 
furnished to the tenants and occupants 
of the building who desired such util-
ity service. Since the landlord was 
unable to dispose of all the heat and 
electricity to his tenants, he entered 
into contracts with three adjoining 
property owners to furnlsh them heat 
and power. 
The Wisconsin Railroad Commis-
1 (1911) 147 Wis 320. 133 NW 157, 37 
baum, Rieser & Hansen, Madison, for LRA NS 510. 
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sion, which had jurisdiction O\'er 
public utilities at th:it time, contended 
'.hat the bndlord was a "public util-
ity" as delined in ~ li9irn-[, Stats 
I now S 196.01 ( 1 ), Stats). The com-
111ission argued that the furnishing of 
he:it, light, :ind power "to anyone else 
than to one's self is furnishing it to 
the public within the meaning of the 
statute. " 2 This court stated: 
It was not the furnishing 
nf heat, light, or power to tenants, or, 
incident:illy, to a few neighbors, th;it 
the legislature sought to regulate, but 
the furnishing oi those commodities to 
the public; that is, to whoever might 
require the same. Wisconsin Ri\'er 
Tmprov. Co. v Pier (1908) 137 Wis 
325, 118 NW 857, 21 LRA ~S 538. 
The use to which the plant. e<Juipment. 
or some portion thereof is put must 
be for the public, in order to consti-
tute it a public utility. But whether 
or not the use is for the public does 
not necessarily depend upon the num-
ber of consumers ; for there may be 
nnly one. . . . On the other hand. 
a landlord may furnish it to a hundred 
tenants, or, incidentally, to a few 
neighbors, without coming under the 
letter or the intent of the law. In the 
instant case, the purpose of the plant 
was to serve the tenants of the owners, 
a restricted class, standing in a cer-
t;iin contract relatiun with them, and 
not the public. . . . 
". . . The tenants of a landlord 
are not the public; neither arc a few 
of his neighbors, or a few isolated 
individuals with whom he may choose 
'Id, 147 Wis at p. 324, 133 NW at r. 158. 
s I<l. 147 Wis at rp. 324-326, 133 NW at 
p. 158, 
to deal, though they arc a part of the 
pulilic. The word 'public' must be 
construed to mean more than a lim-
ited cbss <lefined bv the relation of 
hndlord and tenant~ or 1"· nearness 
oi location. as neighbors: ur more 
than a few who, liy reason of any 
peculiar relation to the owner of the 
plant, can be served by him. 
" . [The statute] was not in-
tended tn affect the rel:ition of land-
lmd and tenant, or to abridge the 
right to contract with a few neighbors 
for a strictly incidental purpose, 
though relating to a service covered 
by it."3 
Chapter 499, Laws oi 1907, which 
provided for the regulation of public 
utilities and contained the definition 
oi "public utility" found in§ 1797m-1 
(now ~ 106.01 (IL Stats) had J,ccnme 
generally known as the Puhlic l'tili-
ties Law.4 The commission to which 
this regulation had been entrusted was 
the then recently created \Visconsin 
Railroad Commission. John Barnes 
was the first chairman of this regula-
tnry comn11ss1on. It is nnteworthy 
that when the Cawker case reached 
the cnurt in 1911, Barnes was then 
a member nf this tribunal and con-
curred in the decision. 
The stat11tory definition of "public 
utility" in § 179im-1 has not been 
amenclctl in any relevant portion since 
this cnurt's decision in Cawker, and 
the ~ame definition may be found to-
day in § 196.01 ( 1). Stats. This court 
has long been committed to the prin-
ciple that a construction given to a 
stat11te hy the court becomes a part 
thereof. unless the legislature sub-
t Sec Crow. Legislative Control of Public 
Utilities in Wisconsin (1933) 18 ::\[arquette 
LR 80, 
419 71 PUR3d 
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ser1uently amends rhe statute to effect 
a change.' 
The courts of California,6 :\Iis-
souri,7 Ohio,8 and Pennsylvania' have 
similarly held that a landlord who 
furnishes utility senice to his tenants 
is not a public utility within the def-
inition thereof contained in the ap-
plicable state law. Appellant has been 
unable to cite a sinble authority t'J 
the contrary. 
\Ve consider the Pennsylvania 
court's recent decision in Drexel-
brook Associates v Pennsylvania 
Public Utility Commission10 to be 
highly significant in view oi appel-
lant's argument that the rule an-
nounced in Cawker should not be 
extended to a large apartment com-
plex such as the instant one. Drexel-
brook Associates is the owner of a 
real-estate development known as 
Drexelbrook. It is a garden-type 
apartment village with 90 buildings 
containing 1.223 residential units, 9 
retail stores, and a club with a 
5 Moran v Quality Aluminum Casting Co. 
( 1967) 34 Wis 2d 5-12. 556, 150 ~V2d 137; 
:'.!ednis v Industrial Commission (1965) 27 
Wis 2d 439. ~. 13-1 NW2d 416: Hahn v 
'.Val"ort:i County (1961 ~ 1-1 Wis 2ct 147, 154, 
109 NW2d 653. 94 :\LR2d 618: ~feyer v In-
dustrial Commission ( 1961) 13 Wis 2d 377, 
382, 103 :-.1\\"Zd 556: Thomas v Industrial 
Commission (1943) 243 Wis 231, 240, IO 
N\\"2d 206. 147 .-\LR 103: :'.!ilwaukee County 
v City of ~lih,·aukee (1933) 210 Wis 336, 
3-11. 246 :-;w 4-17; Eau Claire National Bank 
v Benson (1900) 106 Wis 624, 627, 628, 82 
NW 604. 
71 PUR Jd 420 
dining room, swimming pool, skatin" 
rink, and tennis courts. The Penns,·~ 
vania supreme court held that the 
tenants of a landlord, although many 
in number. do not constitute '"the 
public" within the meaning of Penn-
sylvania's Public Utility Law, but 
constitute rather a defined, privileged, 
and limited group. The court held 
that the proposed service of electricity 
to them thus would be private in 
nature. 
As in the instant appeal, it was 
argued in the Drexelbrook Associates 
case that regulation was desirable to 
protect the interest of the tenants in 
so large an apartment complex. In 
disposing of this argument the Penn-
sylvania court stated : 
"The controlling consideration is 
not whether regulation is desirable. 
but whether appellant [Drexelbrook 
Associates] is subject to regulation 
under the Public Utility Law."11 
Judgment affirmed. 
e Story v Richardson (1921) 186 Cal 162, 
198 Pac 1057, 18 ALR 750. 
7 Missouri a rel. and to use of Cirese v 
".\fosouri Pub. Service Commission (1944) 
-- Mu App -, 54 PL-:l NS 169, 178 SW2d 
788. 
•Jonas v Swetland Co. 119 Ohio St 12, 
PIJRl928D 825, 162 NE 45. 
• Drexelbrook Associates v Pennsylvania 
Pub. Utility Commission (1965) 418 Pa 430, 
60 PUR3cl 175, 212 A2d 237. 
IO Su~ra. footnote 9. 
11 Id. 418 Pa at pp. 441, 442, 60 PUR3d at 
p. 181, 212 A2d at p. 242. 
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DREXELBROOK ASSOCIATES v P. U. C. 
PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT 
Drexelbrook Associates 
v 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission 
.; 
- Pa -, 212 A2d 237 
J unc 30, 1965 
J\ PPE.AL from judgment affirming co111missio11 decision which 
.1l.. d1soppro<:ed proposed sale mzd tra11sfer of utility facilities 
to apartment complex; reversed and rema11ded with i11structio11s 
to gra11t approval. 
Public utilities, § 41 - Private ,-rir:e - Landlord ser.!i.~ to tenants. 
1. An apartment comple.."< proposing to render service to its tenants only, and 
at a profit, serves a defined, privileged, and limited group, and the proposed 
sen-ice to them is private in nature and not a public utility service since it 
would not be furnished "to or for the public," as provided by Public l:tility 
Law, p. li3. 
Consolidation, merger, and sale, § 35 - Grounds for appro~·al or disaPProval -
Loss of jurisdiction over service. 
2. It was error for the commission to disallow the sale and transfer of 
utility distribution and metering facilities to an apartment comple.."< on the 
ground that the transfer would remove from commission supen·ision sen·ice 
presently subject to its jurisdiction, for the commission did not have juris-
diction with respect to public policy in this matter since the service was not 
rendered "to or for the public," as provided by the Public Utility Law; the 
controlling consideration was not whether regulation was desirable but 
whether the transferee of the facilities was subject to regulation under the 
law, p. 180. 
(CoHEl<, J~ with whom EAGEN, J., joins, dissents, p. 182.) 
,. 
APPEARANCES: Irving R. Segal, 
Philadelphia, for appellant; Daniel F. 
Joella, Harrisburg, for appellee. 
Before Bell, CJ., and ~Iusmanno, 
Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O'Brien, and 
Roberts, JJ. 
ROBERTS,. J.; 
[1] Applications to the public util-
I The appro'l'al was sought under § 202(e) 
of the Public Utility Law. Act oi ~lay 28, 
1937, PL 1053, 66 PS § 1122(e), as amended 
ity commission were filed by the Phil-
adelphia Electric Company and the 
Philadelphia Suburban Water Com-
pany seeking approYal of the transfer 
by sale of certain equipment.1 Com-
mission approval would enable the 
applicants to transfer distribution. 
service-supply, and metering equip-
by Act of August 24, 1963, PL 1225, § 2, 66 
PS ~ 1122 (Supp 1964). 
175 60 PURJd 
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mcnt to D,·cxe!Liroc•k Associates, a rcg-
i>'ered l:mited partnerslup 1vhich owns 
acod mano.::;c~.a re::t~-~st:ite c~;\'tlopment 
k::.:111':1 as Drcxeiirook, Drexcl-
brool-;, locJtcd in Drexel }I'll, Dela-
ware COL!nty, is a garden-type ap:irt-
ment vilbge with '-10 buildings, con-
t:iining 1,223 residential units, 9 retail 
stores, v:irious public areas, and a club 
\\'!th :i dining room, swimming pool, 
s:;:iting rink, and tennis courts. 
Tl:c equipment involved in the pro-
posed tramfcr w::ls installed originally 
L>y the applicants in the buildin;::s and 
srorcs of the dc,·clopmcnt and is pres-
ently used by the applicants to furnish 
g:is. \\':lter, and electric sen·ice dircctlv 
to Drcxclbrook tenants. l.'.pon co;-
c1t1~inn uf tlic tran;fcrs. w:i.tcr service 
W<Juld lie supplied by the water com-
p:my directly to DrcxLllirook Asso-
ciates at inur metering points, and g-:is 
and electric service would be supplied 
l1y the electric company to Drcxclbrook 
.\ssociates at :i single metering loca-
tion.' Drexell1rook Associates would 
purchase g:is, electricity, and w1ter 
from the applicants at the proposed 
metering points. In tum, it would as-
sume the obligation and sole respon-
sibility for furnishing :i.nd distributing 
gas, electricity, :i.nd w:iter to its tenants 
and for servicing and maintaining the 
transferred facilities. 
With respect to electricity and gas, 
Drexelhrook Associ:ites assumes that 
it would qualify for wholesale tariff 
2 Presently, water service is supplied at 106 
metering poi11ts, electric service is supplied at 
1,335 metering locations, nnd gas service is 
supplied at !,28J existing location•. 
3 Although the commission itself seem• to 
have assumed prcviou,ly that Drexelbrook 
would qualify for the wholesale rate•, it now 
questions for the first time in its brief before 
this court whether Drexelbrook is so quali-
fied. Even assuming the relevance of this 
rates at such single metering points,3 
and proposes to retain the transierred 
meters in order to measure ead~ of its 
tenant's individual consm'lptitJn. It 
has agreed to bill each tenant on the 
basis of such con.;nmption at the same 
rate which the tenant would pay ii 
he .received senice individually and di-
rectly from the electric company, there-
by enabling it to make a profit. In 
like manner, Drexelbrook :\ssociates 
assumes that, with respect t0 11·:iter, 
it wcul<l also qualify for the applicable 
wl10lcs:ile tariff r:ites li:isccl on single 
point w::iter metering service.• It pro-
poses to continue to furnish \,·ater to 
apartment tenants on the existing b:isis 
by including the ch:irges for water 
services within the rent. E1·idcntly, 
rcmctering of w:iter at a prolit is con-
tcmplalccl only with respect to the 
swim club :tnd store tenants. 
The commission dismissed the appli-
cat;ons without he:iring on .\u~ust 19, 
l<JG3. Drexclbrook Associates then 
asked the commission to reopen the 
matter and to grant it leaye to inter-
vene and offer evid~nce in support of 
the applications. The request was 
gr:i.nted but after a subsequent hearing 
the commission by a vote of 3-2, dis-
missed the applications on .Tune 8, 
1964. Thereafter, Drexelbrook Asso-
ciates appealed to the superior court& 
which divided equally, thereby affirm-
ing the commission's order. A major-
ity of the superior court then certified 
factor in the present proceeding, we will not 
now indulge in a fact-fincling process which 
the corr.mission itself did not sec lit to under-
take. 
t Sec footnote 3, 111 pra. 
& Neither the Philadelphia Electric Company 
nor the Philadelphia Suburban Water Com-
pany, applicants before the commission, took 
an appeal from the commission's determination. 
~PUR~ l~ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tl1e C:l>C to this cuurt ior considcr;ltion 
.uid <iccision. 6 
Jn d1,1n1"ing the applications, the 
C<>J1n111,,1un he!J that upon consumrna-
: 1· >11 ui the proposed transiers oi the 
,;,,,:;natcJ service anJ metering equip-
n1c:ll, app~llant would become subject 
to ti1e provisions of the Public l:tility 
L:iw. 7 For that reason, the commis-
,ion concluded that it would be neces-
sary for :tppcllant to seek commission 
:u1~l1urization to furnish the puulic 
ut:iity services now rendered uy tlie 
~~11piic;:ints. 
The term "public utility" is dclincJ 
in s 2 of the Public Gtility Law as 
including "persons or corporations 
owning or opcracing in this 
""n1111onwc:ilth equipment, or facilities 
iur: (a) [ P J roducing, generating, 
tr:111smitting, distributing, or furnish-
i11:; 11;1tural or artificial gas, electricity, 
to or for lite public for com-
rcnsation; ( b) [ d] iverting, develop-
111;, pumping, impounding, distribut-
ing, or furnishing water to or for the 
f'11/J/ic for compensation "8 
(Emphasis supplied.) The question 
rresented is whether the service which 
appellant proposes to furnish to its 
tenants would be service to or for the 
f'1tblic within the meaning of the stat-
ute. 
A number of decisions prove help-
ful in deciding the question in this 
case. In Borough of Ambridge v 
Pennsylvania Pub. Service Commis-
sion, 108 Pa Super Ct 298, PUR1933 
D 298, 165 At! 47, al!ocatur den 108 
Pa Super Ct xxiii, where a manufac-
turer who furnished water to another 
e Sec Act of June 24, 1895, PL 212, § 10, 
17 PS § 197. 
•Act of May 28, 1937, PL 1053, §§ 1 et seq. 
u amended. 66 PS §§ 1101 et seq. 
[121 177 
n1~u1ul~lcturcr \\'J.S iiclt.1 not to Le ren-
dering a pctli!ic scn·ice, the court said 
that ... [ t J he pub! ic or rri\ ate character 
of the cntcrl'rise docs not dcpc:iJ ... 
upon tf:e number oi persons bv \\'horn 
it is used, but uron \\'hether. or not 
it is open to the use and service of all 
members of the p11biic who may reqnire 
it . . . .' " (Emphasis surplied.) 
108 Pa Super Ct at p. 30+. PL"R1933 
D at p 301, 165 At! at p. +9 .. \roni-
m'.nk Transp. Co. v Pc1111wh·ania Pnh. 
Scn·ice C.m1mi-;sion ( 19.~+) 111 :'a 
Super Ct +l+, 5 Pl'R ~S 219. 110 
1\tl 315, was a c:ise where :i corpora-
tion O[Jerated arartment houses anJ 
furnished bus transrortation to its ten-
ants. :Ccc:iuse the corporation serYecl 
only those who were sclcc·ted as tenants 
-a special cbss of pcrsnns not open 
to the indefinite public-the court hl'!cl 
the service to lie pri\·atc in nature.• 
The court concluded t:1at the service 
rendered was merely incidental to t!1e 
business of maintaining the apartment 
house, and the fact that the tr:inspor-
tation was furnished to hundreds of 
individuals residing in the 288 ;ip:irt-
ments did not transform the private 
nature of the service into a "public 
service." 
Overlook Develop. Co. v Penn-
sylvania Pub. Service Commission. 
101 Pa Super Ct 217, PUR1931E 68, 
affd per curi:un ( 1932) 306 Pa +3, 
158 Atl 869, inrnlved a land develop-
ment company which distributed \\':Jtcr 
not only to vendees situated on its 
previously owned tract of land, but 
also to owners of adjacent land. The 
court held the service was not open 
I Act of ~Cay 28, 1937, PL IO~J. § 2(17) 
(a) & (b), 66 PS § 1102(17) (a) & lb). 
•The court cited with approval the quota-
tion from Borough of Ambridge, 111~ro, in 
text. 
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!'I .\\~\L\.\.\i.\ ~Ll'l'l.\11. UJLRT 
tri :'1c :n<lcfinite puulic but, be;ng con-
:incd to ;irivilc;cd indivi<lu;:lls, was pri-
'. :1tc in !1~t~1rc. Si;,:!li1ic:tntly. tlic crJ111-
n11":"11 •hc:t, in (;:1rnp \\'ul1clo v 
~·(,, ·t~:ttc nf .St. IsJ:-tc Jug-ues ( 1Sl38), 
JG l'J. l'L'C 377, adltcrcd to the doc-
trine expressed in Overlook, stating 
t!1at "a public use . . 'is not con-
lined to rrivileged individuals, but is 
open to the indetinitc public' "and that 
"'it is tl1is indefinite or unrestricted 
quality that gives it its puliiic char-
.'.lc!cr.'" Pl,.R1031E at p. i3.) 
.\!though the present case involves 
the O\\'ner of an apartment complex 
wltich proposes to render service to its 
tc11a11ts and to no one else, the com-
mission held that the contemplated 
sen ice would not be merely incidental 
to the operation of Drexcl11rook, but 
would be a separate and distinct enter-
prise ior profit, subject to the Public 
Ctility Law. In part, the commission 
based its conclusion on the fact that 
appellant does not propose to reserve 
the right to select its customers, but 
would obligate itself under separate 
and uniform contracts to furnish serv-
ice to all tenants, present and future, 
in it> development. The fallacy oi 
this reasoning is shown in the dis-
senting opinion of the commission 
chairman which stated that the test 
"is not [whether] ;;.ll tenants 
are being furnished [service,] but 
whether anybody among the public 
outside oi the Drexellirook group is 
privileged to demand service." 10 In 
the present case tlte only persons who 
would be entitled to and who would 
receive service arc those who have 
entered into or will enter into a land-
lord-tenant relationship with appellant. 
Here, as in Aronimink, those to be 
serviced consist only of a special cbss 
oi persons-those to be selected as 
tenants-and not a class open to the 
indefinite public. Such persons clearlv 
constitute a clefincd, privileged, and 
limited group and the proposed service 
to them would be private in .iature. 11 
The commission concedes that a 
landlord would not be a public utility 
if its charge for utility service is in-
cluded, unitemized, in a flat rental. 
The commission contends, however, 
that appellant's intention to remetcr 
the service, charge separately for it, 
and make a profit presents a "aifferent 
situation" and results in the proposed 
service being public in nature. 12 How-
ever, it is apparent that whether or 
not the utility charge is included in a 
flat rental or determined through sub-
metering, it still constitutes compensa-
tion to the landlord. We fail to see 
how the method of computing the 
charge for the utility service is in any 
sense determinative of or rclt!vant to 
the issue of whether the service is "to 
10 (1964) 41 Pa PUC 505, 515. lieve that there is considerable submetering by 
11 The record shows many instances where landlords without certificates ol public con-
landlords and owners of large apartments and venience from the commission. • , . Ob-
oilicc buildings purchase utility service on a viously the minority opinion [apparently of 
wholesale basis and furnish such service to the commission] and appellant confuse those 
their ollice and apartment tenants. Included situations where a landlord receives wholesale 
:imong these arc the Presidential Apartments, rate! and i11cl11dts tlit cost of thcst scn·icr.s 
Rittenhouse Claridge, Rittenhouse Savoy (all ;,. the rent, with the obviously different situa· 
in Philadelphia), and Lynncwoo<l Gardens (in tion involved in the instant appeals. Admitted-
:Montgomery county), the latter containing ly the Pennsylvania Utility Commission is not 
1,796 anartment units, a rent control commission and has asserted no 
u In ·,ts brief, the commission says: "Ap- jurisdiction over rents." (Emphasis in orig· 
pellant would have this Honorable C-Ourt be- inal.) 
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r1r inr ~:1c ;n1iii1c. 11 fTJite ch:tr~c to 
t!·c :L·11~111t La...:cd upun the an~ount 
'.\ ''ll'il '1:c r:nt1c•:l:tr tenant J.ctually 
'H; I J.S [lropu<cd in this lpplic:ition) 
,, ::1r 111<•rc c11uitalilc to the tcn:int th:rn 
: 1n11osing :i hidden and unidentified 
:1c:11 in the rental charge without any 
,f:owing by the bndlord of the basis 
'" .,..i1·ch the urility charge is calcu-
:.1:cd. " 13 
E1·cn ~he members of the superior 
criurt who voted to uphold the com-
mi"inn' s order stated "that the 
distinction made Gy the commission Ge-
tll'ccn inclnclin; the cost of utility serv-
:ce in a ibt rental charge :ind suli-
n•etcring is a distinction without a 
difference :rnd the question in this ap-
11cal docs not turn on that fact."" 
These judges also said with respect 
'.o sit11J.tions where the charge is in-
clndcd in the rent: "\\'c :ire not so 
naive as to be! ieve that the cost of 
utilities are supplied free to the ten-
:ints; nor so naive as to bel!eve that 
tile landlord does not make a profit 
under such circumstances."u 
However, we cannot agree with the 
view, expressed by the three affirming 
judges of the superior court, that the 
present case may be distinguished from 
l:J From the dissentin~ opinion of the com~ 
mission chairman. 41 Pa PUC at p. jl 9. 
U ( 1965) 206 Pa Super Ct at 135, 212 .\2d 
229, 233. 
Thus, in this reg:lrd, the eommission dis-
senterg and both the three aflirminir and two 
of the dissenting judges of the sllpcrior court 
were in 3greement 
'' 206 Pa Super Ct at p. 135, 212 A2d at p. 
233. 
A significant decision, not discussed by the 
majority of the commission in the present c:ise, 
i• Pennsylvania Pub. l:tility Commission v 
Philadelphia Electric Co. ( 1942) 23 Pa PL'C 
320. In that decision the commission deter-
mined that it would not prohibit the "'metering 
or resale of current by the owner of an office 
building to his tenant•. For a further discu>• 
sion of the =e. see footnote 20, U.fro. 
0Ycr:n(1k :-tnrl ;\;-nni111ink on the 
li;l ..... i:-; oi tlic .;,.__::,·.1c11cc of r1\\11Cr-..liip of 
the c•:uip11:c:it i11""hcd. In :i1c Yicw 
oi tl;osc jud.~c5, the c~~-~cs :1rc d!~ti11-
g111,hai>ic on the thco1·y th:it :ip:trt-
mcnt owners or landowners initialh· 
owned the equipment in Overlook and 
J\ronimink, while in the pre>cnt c:tse 
the equipment, from the time oi inst:il-
lation to the :tpplication for tr:tn.>icr, 
h:i; lieen "'med liy p11l>lic utilitic,; sub-
ject to commission jurisdiction. 
Ti1c detcrmin:ttion of whether :tp-
pcll:111t would J,c serving the jl!llilic 
:titer the tr:insfers are completed is 
unrelated to tlic idcntitv n[ tl1c tr:tn.;-
feror of the designated ;ssets or to the 
fact that the equipment pre,·iou,;!y h:td 
"been dcdic:ttccl to a public use :111d 
impressed with a public intcrest." 16 
The Cf]Uij'lllC,1t ros:;esses no :n:·stic:tl 
q11:tlitics or ch:ir:tcteri,;tics -,,·Jiich ren-
der the service ior which it is utilized 
a pu\Jlic service irrespccti\'e of the pri-
vate or public nature of the scn·iccs 
or the <lcfinite (tenants) or indefinite 
(public) idcntilic:ttion of the persons 
served. The determination as to 
whether appcll:int woul<l be engaged 
in a public utility serYice cannot be 
predicated upon whether it originally 
15 206 Pa Sllpcr Ct at p. 136, 212 A2cl at p. 
234. This concept, takc:t irom raf(·-1111:/;ing 
di:c1sio11s ( C.f!., City oi Pittshur.~h v P('nnsyl-
vania Pub. Service Commi:-.sion [ 1949J 165 
Pa Surer Ct 519, 528, ~2 Pl'R .:\S 5i2. 09 .\2d 
W, 849, allocatur drn 165 Pa Sllpcr Ct xxv). 
is here misapplied when utilized as a co11sitk•ra-
tion in dcterminini:: whether tlie ~crncc whirh 
appellant c;;ccks to render to it:; tcn:lnts COll!'ti· 
tutcs pul1lic service umkr the Pllblic etility 
Law. Such :tpplication, ii correct, would, for 
all practical purposes, always prcchtdc a trans-
fer of utility equipment to a nonu~ility bccau!IC, 
once inclll<lc<l in the rate structure of a pllhii<' 
utility, that equipment woul<l be immutably 
stamped with public use and interest charac-
teristics. 
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i11sL~l'.cJ the necessary equipment at 
the time of construction, btcr inst:illcJ 
it it,cli, or '.lurck1scJ it irom a utilitv 
"' h ;c!1 Ind ;ri;;in:i\ly installed it. 17 ' 
\\«~ \i11ld, thcrciore, that the pro-
poscJ sen ice which appelbnt would 
renJer in the present case would not 
constitute it a pu\Jlic utility within the 
me:imng- of § 2 of the Public l:tility 
La 11 since such service would not be 
furn1sheJ "to or for the public." 
[2) In the alternative, the commis-
sion he-id tk1t the transfers coulJ not 
\Jc :ipprovcd even if :ippelbnt wou\J 
not !Jc rcnJcring- a pu\Jlie utility service 
upon consummation of the proposed 
t:-:111sicrs because the commission could 
not "Jisregard the public interest and 
ali~11don the public and the consumers 
17 The dissenting opinion in the superior 
C0\1rt quite Jpt!y stated: 
.. It the iacilitics here involved h;i<l hccn orl::!· 
i11;l\\y ill:>t:-i1\cJ by the landlord under si11c:lc 
mc~cri11~ ;rnJ wholc.:;::i.Jc rates granted to the 
b::1·1urrJ b., the t1ti!it1cs, there woul<l he no 
dot1lit oi th.c validity of the tr:::i.nqction. As the 
record in this case shows, such operations ex-
ist • . . in Pcnnsylvan1:i. The circum-
stances that the lamllord now seeks single 
mc~cr and wholesale rat:s should m:ike no 
<lirfcrence in the result \Vhat is le.zal in one 
case rJocs not thereby become invalid in the 
ot~1cr. The s~qucncc of events should not be 
con troll in;;." 206 Pa Super at p. 125, 212 A2d 
at p. 235. 
I! 41 Pa Pl?C at p. 512. 
Presumably, the commission acted under § 
202 oi the Public Utility Law. Act of May 
28, 1937, PL 1053, as amen<lcd, 66 PS § 1122. 
That section requires the commission's approv-
al, evi<lenccd by a certificate of public con· 
vcnicnce, prior to the transfer of assets by a 
pnblic utility to any person and prior to any 
~bandonmcnt of any service to patrons. The is-
seance of such a certilicate is based upon the 
commission's determination that it is necessary 
or proper for the service, accommo<lation, con-
venience, or safety of the public. Although 
factual and legal question• have been raised 
which cast do11bt on the arplicability of that 
portion of § 202 wliich involves abandonment oi 
service, the commission has made no specific 
f1ndin('(S with respect to such questions and 
our disrosition of this appeal mo.kes it un-
necessary for us to express our views respect-
ing them. 
who would become afiected by the 
appron\ of the ::ipplications, to un-
certain but definitely less desiralJle 
prospects. " 19 The members of the 
superior court who voted to :iffirm the 
commission agreed with its position, 
stating th:it "the commission, in exer-
cising its administrative discretion, not 
only may but should deny the transfer 
of patrons out from under regulation, 
even where their consent h:is been ob-
t::iincd, in circumstance< si:ch :is t:1i<; 
case presents, in the public interest and 
as a matter of public policy." 19 
In support of this alternative hold-
ing, the commission engaged in much 
specubtion :is to possib1e evils which 
would flow from consummation of the 
proposed trans[er.2° In substance, 
19 206 Pa Super Ct at p. 134, 135, .21.2 A2cl 
at p. 233 . 
2o For cx:."1mplc. the commission 5u~g-cstctl 
th:tt, without its supervision. Drcxclbrook ten-
ants mi~l1t eventually be subj-·ct to <li.:;crimi11a-
t1on in rates as compared to other tcn~nts 
.,,,.ho arc protcctc<l by commission juris<lict10L1; 
that the practice of submetcring an<l resaic 
might adversely affect the revenue return of 
the public utility companies involved aml cause 
increases in rates to the remaining customers 
of such utilities; and, in the alternative, th~t a 
change in rate structure increasing wholesale 
prices mi~ht make the landlor<l's utility scrv~ 
ice unprofitable. The commission also voiced 
concern over possible inaccuracies in meters. 
It is appropriate to recall .he words of the 
commission in Pennsylvania Pub. Utility Com-
mission v Philadelphia Eleccric Co. (1942) 
23 Pa PUC 320, 42 PUR NS 126, when it 
expressly reiused to prohibit rernetering by 
a landlord: 
"[W]e deem it appropriate to state that we 
have consiuered the advisability of a rule 
ab<olutely prohibiting remctering or resale of 
current. The so-called 'practical' difficulties 
envisaged by respondent as re,ulting from such 
a rule do not rcq11ire detailed comment, but 
it may be observed that some predictions couhl 
not reasonably be expected to eventuate aml 
the fulfillment of others might well produce 
compcnsatin~ benelits. Also, we have no doubt 
of our jurisdiction to consider the reasonable-
ness and justness of any tariff rule and the 
practice thereunder, and to take appropriate 
corrective action if the rule appears unreason-
able or its application unjust: Hickey v Phila· 
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Ji(•\\ c:cr, the posit:on oi liL1lli tlic cn1n-
"' "ion m:ijnrity a:Hl t!tc alT1n11iw~ 
!1w·11iH:rs oi the superior c0ur~ czi.n Le 
,;11c1.•l to the propnsition tliJ.t it i:; 
.~;:L.:1--t i\~c pt)licy to J.ppr1Jrc the 
1r:1'1'l'-·r 'incc it would rt::110\·c fron1 
r, 1!1?1~1::-i3iun supcrYision service nvw 
-::i1.1ccc ~o its jurisdiction. Such rca-
'011i11::;- disregarus the express formula-
nnn oi p111Jiic policy by the legislature 
cn:iiodiecl in the st:itutory de:lnition of 
:!•c •crrn "public utility." Tli:it provi-
,,,,n co11icrs jurisdiction on the corn-
:ni,sirrn 01t!y where the service in-
v11!1·cd is rendered "to or for the pub-
lic." T;1c controlling consiclcr:ition is 
::nt ll'hcthcr rcc:11'ation is clesirablc, but 
11::ctlicr appellant is subject to re~­
!::tic•n unclcr t!te Public Ctility Law. 
J(!:i 11 :in,;ky v Pennsylvania Pub. Serv-
ice Commission ( 1936) 123 Pa Super 
Ct 3/.;, 382, 17 PC'R :\S +01, 187 
.\ti 2-+S, 251. If the legislature did 
11nt deem it necessary to confer juris-
dic:i1m on the commission with respect 
t11 tlte sen·ice proposed by appellant 
(:is the commission concedccl for pur-
poses of its alternative holding), then 
t!tc absence of such jurisdiction as a 
result of the consummation of the pro-
)'ll'u! ~r:cil'tc-r "'"'ilcl not ancl could 11ot 
C'n1t1-:\\ c:~c ptth! 1c policy. Funlter-
niorc, •:ic po<,ilile evils which tlte 
cn1r~r 1 ~':· . .;:i0n c:n·is:-t~ccl as o.. res.ult nf 
tl1c :~li--C!~cc of its supcn·i~iun could 
come to iruitinn irrespective of whether 
a l::incllord ori;i11ally inst:i!ls facilities 
or later purchases them from :i. public 
utility, or whether the charge for serv-
ice is on a metered basis or included 
in a flat rcnt:il without itemiz:i(iop __ 
It seems 0bvious th::tt the s:ime pro-
jcct,·d evils which tlte commission rn:i-
.irrity rnvi,;agccl as possibilities in the 
'.'re,-cJtt c:ise m::iy be equally posited 
in otltcr instances :incl c:ises previously 
approvecl by the commission and the 
superior court. 21 
\Ve hold, therefore, that the com-
mi:<sion crrcu :is a 111~1ttcr of bw in 
ltoldin~ that Drcxcll,rook :\ssoci:ites 
would i>ccnrne J. ptdJ!ic utility upon 
co1i:;u111Jt1:itin:i of tl1e proposcu trans-
iers, :111<1 t!t:it the commission also 
erred in alternatively holding that the 
al:ow:ince of the transfers would con-
tr::t \'cne public policy if the commis-
sion thereby lost its jurisdiction over 
the service im·oh·ed. 
The order is rewrsed. The record 
<lc:phia Electric Co. (1936) 122 Pa Super Ct a tcna11t at a profit to the landlord, the land-
213, 220, 14 PC'R ~S 349, 184 Atl 553 . . \s:<..!c lord in m~· opinion becomes a public utility 1nrl 
frJrn ·practic1t 1 considerations an<l technic;;.l has no ri~lit to t.:xtort J. profit for such s::ilc." 
olncctions to jurisdiction and procedure, our 23 Pa PLC at p. 323. 42 PCR XS at p. 128. 
<lcus1on not to require prohibition of rcmeter· It is sig-11if1c:rnt that. in the face oi thi$ dis· 
in~ or resale turns upon our conclusion that sent: the majority of the commission hcltl oth· 
tl1c record does not show such a requirement cn\"1.se. 
to he necessary at this time for public pro· 21 Sec Pcnn~ylv:mia Pub. Utilit)• Commission 
1cct1on: . . . ." 23 Pa PCC at p. 322, v Ph1bdc•lpltia Electric Co. ( 1942) 23 Pa 
42 PCR ~S at p. 127. PCC 320, 42 Pt:R :-15 126 . . wtra, footnote 20: 
This \angua~e of the commission is especial... :\ronimi11k Tran~p. Co. v Pennsylvania Pub. 
ly notable and meaningful because it was di- Sen·icc C1m1rni<.,ion (19.14) Ill Pa Super Ct 
rectly at odds with the opinion oi o dissenting 414, 5 Pl'R XS 27Q, liO :\ti .175, sutra, text 
member of the commission. The dissenting at p. 177: Borough of :\mhri<lgc v Pennsyl-
commissioncr contended that 'ithe prohibition vania Puh. S~n·icc Commis~ion, 10S Pa Super 
of resales of elcc:ric current involving a prolit Ct 293. P1.:R193Jrl 203, 165 i\tl 47, s11tra, 
to landlords is a requirement that is necessary text at p. 177; Overlook Develop. Co. v 
for public protection." 23 Pa Pt:C at p. 324, Pcnn•vlvania Pub. Service Commission. 101 
42 Pl'R NS at p. 128. The dissent also stated: Pa s;1per Ct 217, Pl:Rl931E 63, affd per 
"When the Philadelphia Electric Company curiam ( 1932) 306 Pa 43. 153 Atl 869, s11pra, 
sells to a landlord and the landlord resells to text at p. li7. See also footnote II, supra, 
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is rcmamkcl :i.nd the commission is 
directed to :ipprove the :ipplications 
:incl to issue the appropriate certifi-
cates. 
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